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UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: 
FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL, FROM DESCRIPTIVE TO 
NORMATIVE 
Paul Schiff Berman 
As a scholarly project, global legal pluralism has been extraordinarily successful, and it is not 
difficult to see why. Legal pluralists had long observed that, in any given social context, people 
are regulated by multiple different legal and quasi-legal regimes and that these regimes are 
sometimes associated with formal state law, but sometimes they are not.1 Global legal pluralism 
took that insight and applied it to the post–Cold War international and transnational arena at just 
the right moment. Circa 1998, international and transnational institutions were proliferating, 
industry standard-setting bodies and corporate codes of conduct were taking on new prominence, 
and the rise of online interaction meant that social life was increasingly deterritorialized and that 
almost any piece of electronic data or any online interaction could implicate multiple regulatory 
regimes.2 This complex web of regulatory bodies included some regimes that were state-based, 
 
1 For a discussion of the emergence of global legal pluralism from earlier scholarship on legal pluralism, 
see Paul Schiff Berman, “The New Legal Pluralism,” Annual Review of Law & Social Science 5 
(2009): 225–42. 
2 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, “Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of Social Life,” in 
Research Handbook on the Law of Virtual and Augmented Reality, eds. Woodrow Barfield and Marc 
Jonathan Blitz (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 662–84. 
some that were built and maintained by nonstate actors, some that fell within the purview of 
local authorities and jurisdictional entities, and some that involved international courts, tribunals, 
arbitral bodies, and regulatory organizations.3 
Global legal pluralism provided scholars with a theoretical lens for conceptualizing the 
complex interactions among these various legal and quasi-legal entities. Most importantly, the 
pluralist perspective allowed theorists to extricate themselves from intractable and largely 
fruitless debates about what should count as law and what should not. For example, many 
international relations theorists, as well as scholars influenced by game theory and other 
formalist models of power, argued that international law was not truly law, given the absence of 
coercive enforcement.4 Likewise, those focused only on official lawmaking bodies tended to 
 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this context, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A 
Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
4 See, e.g., Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to The Study of 
International Relations (New York: Harper Perennial, 1964), 85–88 (rejecting 
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the principles commonly invoked in international 
politics were “unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national 
interest at a particular time”); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) (using game theory and rational choice modeling in an 
effort to show that international law has no independent valence); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (1948; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 5 
(noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”); Kenneth N. Walz, Theory 
of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 122 (arguing 
miss the potent power of non-state law-making, such as industry-specific regulatory entities or 
standard-setting organizations.5 Meanwhile, networks of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
promulgating rules, standards, ratings, transparency metrics, and the like wielded important 
influence that was often missed by those only willing to look at state-based law.6 And 
corporations, particularly online platforms such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple, 
increasingly deployed the tools of transnational legal enforcement more effectively than 
territorially bounded nation-states.7 
 
that “although states may be disposed to react to international constraints and incentives,” they do so 
only if such actions conform with the state’s internal interests); Robert H. Bork, “The Limits of 
‘International Law,’” National Interest 18 (Winter 1989–1990): 3–10, 3 (arguing against the 
importance of international law); Francis A. Boyle, “The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism 
Between International Law and International Politics,” California Western International Law Journal 
10 (1980): 193–219, 201 (arguing that World War II itself made clear that states cannot rely solely on 
international law to protect their interests). 
5 See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, “A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three 
Trade Finance Instruments,” Yale Journal of International Law 30, no. 1 (2005): 125–209. 
6 See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender 
Violence, and Sex Trafficking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
7 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, “Borders and Bits,” Vanderbilt Law Review 71 (2018): 179–240; see also 
Paul Schiff Berman, “Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of Data,” Vanderbilt Law Review 
71 (2018): 11–32. 
Global legal pluralism applied the insights of sociolegal scholarship and turned its gaze 
away from abstract questions of legitimacy and toward empirical questions of efficacy and more 
complex accounts of institutionalized collective action. Thus, pluralists de-emphasized the 
supposedly clear distinctions between a norm, a custom, a law, a standard, a moral command, a 
sociological consensus, a psychological imperative, and the like. Instead, a pluralist approach 
focused on both enacted law and what has sometimes been called “implicit” or “interactional” 
law, the purposive practices that groups of people enter into that impact their practical sense of 
binding obligation.8 In addition, pluralists recognized that both enacted and interactional legal 
norms tend to seep into consciousness, such that the mere existence of these commands, whether 
enforced or not, may sometimes alter the power dynamics or options placed on the table in 
policy discussions. Of course, questions of legitimacy and efficacy are inextricably linked, but 
pluralists argue that once we come to recognize multiple sources of transnational and nonstate 
authority, it is difficult to maintain any single abstract conception of law. At best, authority is 
always relative and always contested, and our models for describing law should reflect that 
pluralism.9 
Global legal pluralism also allowed scholars to emphasize the constant interaction among 
these legal and quasi-legal systems. If authority and jurisdiction are never absolute but are 
 
8 See Wibren Van Der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality: A Pluralist Account of Legal 
Interactionism (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 98–105 (drawing on theorist Lon Fuller to 
develop a theory of interactional law). 
9 See Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
instead always relative and contested, then we need to study that contestation, see how regulatory 
norms move across territorial borders, analyze networks of influence, and try to tease out 
changes in legal consciousness over time—the often unnoticed and subtle shifts in people’s 
taken-for-granted sense of the way things are or have to be.10 Significantly, these changes in 
legal consciousness can be influenced by norms that are articulated even without coercive power 
behind them. 
 
10 See, e.g., Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 30–32 (examining “the role of legal ideology in structuring 
mass consciousness”); Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from 
Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 45 (defining “legal consciousness” and 
arguing that “every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal concepts or terminology—
whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to resist—legality is produced” and 
“repeated invocation of the law sustains its capacity to comprise social relations”); Michael W. 
McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 7 (“Legal (or rights) consciousness . . . refers to the ongoing, 
dynamic process of constructing one’s understanding of, and relationship to, the social world through 
use of legal conventions and discourses.”) (emphasis in original); Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice 
and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working-Class Americans (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 5 (arguing that “[l]egal consciousness is expressed by the act of going to court as 
well as by talk about rights and entitlements” and that such “[c]onsciousness develops through 
individual experiences”); Susan S. Silbey, “Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law,” Law & 
Social Inquiry 17, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 39–48, 42 (noting that “law contributes to the articulation of 
meanings and values of daily life”). 
Finally, moving from the descriptive to the normative, communities drawing on the insights 
of global legal pluralism might sometimes affirmatively seek to create or preserve spaces for 
productive interaction among multiple, overlapping communities and legal systems by 
developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to bring those 
communities and systems into dialogue rather than dictating norms hierarchically. Such an 
approach is not derived from any overarching universal set of substantive truths and does not 
require a commitment to particular substantive values. They only require a pragmatic willingness 
to engage with other possible normative systems and potentially to restrain one’s own voice for 
the sake of forging more workable, longer-lasting relationships and harmony among multiple 
communities. In this way, law becomes a forum for dialogue across difference. Thus, global 
legal pluralism provided a useful framework for both designing and evaluating legal institutions 
and procedures, separate from their substantive aims. 
In short, during the past two decades, a rich body of work has established pluralism as an 
important descriptive and normative framework for understanding a world of overlapping 
jurisdictional assertions, both state and nonstate. During that time, there has been a veritable 
explosion of scholarship on legal pluralism, soft law, global constitutionalism, the relationships 
among relative authorities, and the fragmentation and reinforcement of territorial boundaries. 
Some of this work explicitly references legal pluralism and draws on the robust literature 
theorizing the interaction of legal and quasi-legal systems. However, some does not. Indeed, a 
number of the contributors to this volume would surely not have identified their work as 
grappling with issues of legal pluralism prior to my inviting them to participate in this project. 
But in many ways, that is precisely the point. Legal pluralism simply is the reality underlying the 
work of any scholar or policymaker who seeks to address the contestation among norm-
generating communities, the interaction of legal authorities, or the ways in which norms seep 
across territorial borders and are used, transformed, or contested locally. The goal of this volume 
is to encourage scholars studying different substantive areas of law to use global legal pluralism 
as a theoretical framework that might help them to conceptualize both the descriptive and 
normative issues they face. 
1 From Local to Global 
Legal pluralism historically focused on particularized geographical locations of contestation. 
Anthropologists situated themselves in local context and analyzed the complex dynamics of legal 
jurisdictional overlap in specific settings. Likewise, historians of empire largely emphasized 
situations in which imperial legal regimes attempted (with varying degrees of success) to 
displace local regimes. And political theorists analyzed church-state relations, again in specific 
contexts. Legal pluralism was an exercise in “thick description,” rooted in a detailed analysis of 
the day-to-day dynamics of legal systems and their challenges, as well as the acts of resistance 
by local agents on the ground. 
The move from legal pluralism to global legal pluralism thus faces significant challenges. 
How, after all, can a very particularized, context-dependent scholarship of thick description be 
useful in conceptualizing anything “global”? Or, to put it another way, how can any theory of 
pluralism possibly be global? Aren’t those two words fundamentally in tension with each other? 
Any descriptive or normative approach that purports to be global seems by definition to ignore or 
attempt to eliminate pluralism. Likewise, any approach emphasizing pluralism is intrinsically 
about diversity and contestation and therefore cannot possibly be global. 
So, how to respond? 
To begin, I think it is important to understand that global legal pluralism is not a global 
theory in one sense. It certainly does not purport to offer one definition of law or one legal 
regime that would or could operate on a global scale. Such a universalist approach would be 
antithetical to the whole notion of pluralism. More fundamentally, pluralists properly recognize 
that no legal regime could ever be global. As Hans Lindahl has observed, there is no way to 
conceptualize a normative legal order, even of the most inclusive sort, that does not somehow 
exclude as well as include because there will always be some who resist and refuse to recognize 
that order.11 Thus, it is impossible to offer any descriptive or normative account of law, no matter 
how deferential to pluralism, that will not effectively eliminate some of the pluralism by creating 
boundaries between what is included and what is excluded. Indeed, there may be no way out of 
this conundrum if one wants to posit any sort of account of how law or legal institutions ought to 
be conceptualized. Clearly “global” cannot mean “universal.” 
However, that does not mean that the word “global” is not useful in this context. As the 
chapters in this book make abundantly clear, legal pluralism is not only a local phenomenon. 
Local communities are affected by, and in turn strategically deploy, foreign legal norms and 
jurisdictional assertions as well as globally produced normative tropes and rhetorical styles. 
Meanwhile, the transnational arena is replete with normative systems and jurisdictional claims 
 
11 Hans Lindahl, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 2 (“No global legal order is universal or universalisable because unification 
and pluralisation are the two faces of the single, ongoing process of setting the boundaries of legal 
orders, global or otherwise.”). 
by a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities. Legal pluralism provides a useful 
way of conceptualizing the interaction of all these various norm assertions and their potential 
efficacy. 
But then we need a word to describe this nonlocal legal pluralism. It is not “international” 
because the analysis is not limited to the interactions of territorially defined nation-states. And it 
is not, as discussed previously, universal. The question therefore is whether the word “global” 
captures something essential that would otherwise be missed. 
I think it does. As I have argued elsewhere,12 global legal pluralism occupies a crucial 
cosmopolitan middle ground between what we might call sovereigntist territorialism on the one 
hand and universalism on the other. Thus, neither “international” nor “universal” fits the bill. It is 
worth taking a moment to understand why. Recall that the central insight of global legal 
pluralism is that we live in a world of hybrid legal spaces, where multiple normative regimes 
may govern (or at least strongly influence) our activities and where authority tends to be relative, 
not absolute. 
Sovereigntist territorialism represents a retreat from this messy hybrid world of 
multiple, overlapping normative authority. Instead, the state-centric view of the world rests 
on the convenient fiction that nation-states exist in autonomous, territorially distinct spheres 
and that activities therefore fall under the legal jurisdiction of only one regime at a time. For 
example, traditional legal rules have tied jurisdiction to territory: a state could exercise 
complete authority within its territorial borders and no authority beyond it. In the twentieth 
 
12 See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders, supra note 3. 
century, such rules were loosened, but territorial location has remained the principal touchstone 
for assigning legal authority. Accordingly, if one could spatially ground a dispute, one could 
most likely determine the legal rule that would apply. But consider such a system in today’s 
world. Should the U.S. government be able to sidestep the U.S. Constitution when it houses 
prisoners in “offshore” detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere around the 
world? Should spatially distant corporations that create serious local harms be able to escape 
local legal regulation simply because they are not physically located in the jurisdiction? 
How can we best understand the complex relationships among international, regional, 
national, and subnational legal systems? Does it make sense to think that satellite 
transmissions, online interactions, and complex financial transactions have any territorial 
locus at all? When the U.S. government seeks to shut down the computer of a hacker located 
in Russia, does the virus transmitted constitute an act of war or a violation of Russia’s 
sovereignty? And in a world where nonstate actors such as industry standard-setting bodies, 
NGOs, religious institutions, ethnic groups, terrorist networks, and others exert significant 
normative pull, can we build a sufficiently capacious understanding of the very idea of law to 
address the incredible array of overlapping authorities that are our daily reality? 
Thus, a simple model that looks only to territorial delineations among official state-based 
legal systems is now simply untenable (if it was ever useful to begin with). Thankfully, 
debates about globalization are no longer centered on the polarizing question of whether the 
nation-state is dying or not. But one does not need to believe in the death of the nation-state to 
recognize both that physical location can no longer be the sole criterion for conceptualizing 
legal authority and that nation-states must work within a framework of multiple, overlapping 
jurisdictional assertions by state, international, and even nonstate communities. Each of 
these types of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a potentially hybrid legal space 
that is not easily eliminated. The influence and application of foreign norms or foreign 
decision-making bodies may be useful and productive or alien and threatening, but in any 
event they are inevitable and cannot be willed away by fiat. 
As with sovereigntist territorialism, universalism also represents a retreat from the hybrid 
legal spaces of a pluralist world. Here, instead of responding to normative difference by seeking 
to impose a single local authority, we see the desire to erase normative difference altogether. 
Indeed, international legal theory has long yearned for an overarching set of commitments that 
would establish a more peaceful and harmonious global community. This supposed new world 
order variously focuses on the religiously based natural law principles of international human 
rights or the neoliberal ideology of free trade and its need to harmonize rules that regulate 
commerce. 
One cannot discount the importance of universalism. Certainly since World War II we 
have seen the creation of a dizzying array of international institutions, multilateral and bilateral 
treaties, conventions, cross-border regulatory coordination efforts, and the like. In one way or 
another, all of this activity represents the desire to harmonize conflicting norms. And on 
many fronts, both in public and private law, norms have converged, either through 
hegemonic imposition or global embrace. Moreover, such harmonization has important 
benefits because it tends to lower transaction costs and uncertainty as to what norms will be 
applied to any given activity. Yet there are reasons to question both the desirability and, 
more importantly, the feasibility of universalism, at least in some contexts. This is because 
universalism is based on the premise that people are fundamentally the same despite 
differences in culture and circumstance. In contrast, legal pluralism--founded as it is on 
anthropological observation (and celebration) of cultural difference--rejects the idea that we 
should ever expect or necessarily encourage uniformity. From such a perspective, 
universalism’s efforts to dissolve the multi-rootedness of community affiliation into one 
overarching identity is inherently problematic because it fails to capture the extreme 
emotional ties people still feel to distinct national or local communities. 
In addition, universalism inevitably erases diversity. Indeed, the whole point of a 
universalist or harmonization solution is to combat diversity or fragmentation. Yet, although one 
can appreciate the goal, erasing diversity may involve the silencing of less powerful voices in the 
global conversation. Thus, the presumed universal may also be the hegemonic. This argument is 
most often heard by those who resist international human rights norms or international trade 
agreements because they may run roughshod over important local practices, customs, or 
perspectives. Critics contend that seemingly universal norms tend to become a Western or 
Northern imperialist imposition on less powerful communities or a corporate globalist 
imposition of free market ideology over environmental or labor concerns. In these debates we 
see replayed the insistence on universal imposition on the one hand and the pristine integrity of 
the local community on the other. Both positions are retreats from pluralism. In contrast, a 
global legal pluralist vision focuses on the interactions between these two positions: the ways 
in which local actors deploy the universalist language of human rights or economic 
empowerment or environmental stewardship to advance positions strategically, the ways in 
which so-called local voices interact with seemingly international ones to create change to 
internationalist regimes and assumptions, and so on. Only through this sort of interactive 
vision can we avoid reifying either the universal or the local. The word “global” invokes this 
multi-rooted process rather than dissolving it into sovereigntist territorialism or universalism. 
2 From Sovereignty to Authority 
Instead of focusing on sovereign states, pluralists tend to think in terms of multiple authorities. 
Moreover, they realize that all authority is relative, not absolute. This is particularly true in the 
face of growing transnational and nonstate claims to authority. In such a world, a burgeoning 
collection of authorities inevitably overlaps, interacts, negotiates, and accommodates. These 
authorities inhabit jurisdictional spheres that are often contested, and so the goal of most pluralist 
projects, at root level, is to describe and conceptualize the interactions. 
This idea of relative authority, however, immediately sets up a theoretical conundrum 
because at least some conceptions of authority depend as a definitional matter on that authority 
being absolute, not relative. Indeed, some argue that a relative authority is not a true authority at 
all. For example, Joseph Raz in The Authority of Law argues that central to “the uniqueness of 
law” is law’s claim to comprehensive authority and supremacy.13 According to Raz, “[s]ince all 
legal systems claim to be supreme with respect to their subject-community, none can 
acknowledge any claim to supremacy over the same community which may be made by another 
legal system.”14 
The problem is that even if Raz’s approach were supportable as an abstract philosophical 
matter (itself a debatable assumption), an absolutist conception of legal authority is often simply 
inadequate to fully describe or analyze the transnational world of tangled legal and quasi-legal 
obligations and influences we see around us. Not surprisingly, pluralists challenge such a 
 
13 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 117–21. 
14 Ibid., 119. 
conception. For example, Nicole Roughan in Authorities directly addresses Raz’s argument that 
a legal system by its nature must claim supremacy over other legal systems.15 To Roughan, Raz’s 
argument suffers from both empirical and analytical difficulties. 
As an empirical matter, she argues that the supremacy claim runs counter to actual legal 
practice in Europe, which features “many prima facie legal systems, including those of 
municipal states, that do not claim supremacy over all others, or even claim subjection to 
others.”16 Other pluralists agree. For example, Nico Krisch surveys what he calls “the pluralist 
structure of post national law,” finding, in instance after instance, a more fluid frame that has no 
categorical separation among legal spheres, but that also does not fully merge them or even 
define “the degree of authority” that the norms of these different spheres possess.17 Likewise, 
Keith Culver and Michael Giudice detail many areas where legal hierarchies are not stable, 
including federal and quasi-federal states as well as states that maintain domains of overlap 
among concurrent authorities.18 
Turning to Raz’s more fundamental, analytical claim, Roughan argues that what pluralists 
need to develop, in order to combat Raz’s monist conception, is an “account of law that explains 
 
15 Roughan, supra note 9. 
16 Ibid., 155. 
17 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 12; see also Krisch’s chapter in this volume. 
18 Keith Culver and Michael Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
how different supremacy claims can be integrated and mutually recognized while upholding the 
authority of law.”19 Her idea of relative authority aims to provide such an account. She argues 
that a legal system need not recognize another system as superior; it only needs to “recognize the 
relativity of its own claim to the claim of others, and of their claims to its own.”20 Thus, instead 
of seeing supremacy as a necessary precondition to law, Roughan offers a model of relative 
authorities that must “cooperate, coordinate, or tolerate one another if they are to have 
legitimacy.”21 In this model, the claim to legitimate authority actually occurs through 
interdependence and interaction. It is not reduced authority; instead, authority is linked to its 
interdependence with other similarly relative authorities. 
The pluralist model of relative overlapping authorities, therefore, is not necessarily a claim 
that traditional municipal legal systems have a diminished authority in the twenty-first century, 
though that might be true in some circumstances. Indeed, sometimes a claim to relative authority 
may actually be stronger than a similar claim to absolute authority. For example, Krisch 
describes instances when lower courts within European countries have invoked the authority of 
the European Court of Human Rights to increase their own authority within the domestic judicial 
system.22 In such cases, by intertwining their authority with others they may actually increase 
their authority rather than reduce it. Likewise, if a state works with other states to create 
 
19 Roughan, supra note 9, at 157. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 Nico Krisch, “The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law,” Modern Law Review 71, no. 2 
(Mar. 2008): 183–216. 
institutions that intertwine those states together, the power of each individual state may be 
increased through interdependence. Or a private arrangement created by nonstate actors can 
build authority by imbricating its regime with state entities.23 Or a state-based court system can 
seek to require private corporations to enforce its regulatory rulings, thus expanding the court’s 
jurisdictional reach.24 Or political actors in a local bureaucracy can increase their power and 
influence by invoking nonlocal opinion or pressure.25 In all of these cases mastering the 
negotiation among relative authorities can actually increase power. Thus, the nation-state may 
emerge as powerful or more so, but it will derive its authority not from its autonomy but from its 
relationships with other authorities. Those other authorities, while they can be state-based, also 
include a much broader set of possible bodies, some associated with the state and some not. 
 
23 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 5, at 156–57 (describing how informal rules adopted by a trade association 
to govern export credit insurance was ultimately adopted as a standard by the World Trade 
Organization). 
24 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, “Yahoo! v. Licra, Private International Law, and the Deterritorialisation 
of Data,” in Global Private International Law: Adjudication without Frontiers, eds. Horatia Muir Watt 
et al. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 398–99 (describing a European Court of Justice 
ruling that Google must alter its search algorithms so that search results do not include websites that 
are deemed to run counter to European data privacy regulations). 
25 See, e.g., Laura Dickinson, “The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among Domestic, International, and 
Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia,” in Accountability for Atrocities: National 
and International Responses, ed. Jane Stromseth (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Press, 2003) (describing how local 
actors in Indonesia leveraged the threat of an international commission of inquiry to push for internal Indonesian 
investigation of alleged human rights abuses). 
3 Global Legal Pluralism as a Descriptive Project 
Legal pluralism has generally been a descriptive enterprise. Anthropologists, historians, and 
other social scientists have seen legal pluralism as simply a reality, neither good nor bad, neither 
desirable nor undesirable. Instead, as noted previously, they have defined their task principally as 
an exercise in thick description: cataloging the inevitable hybridity that arises when multiple legal 
or quasi-legal systems occupy the same social space as well as the resulting strategic interactions 
that occur among those navigating the various regimes. 
As a descriptive matter, global legal pluralism, like legal pluralism generally, represented an 
important alternative to liberal legalism. To begin, pluralists are far more likely than traditional 
liberals even to notice the pluralism of legal and quasi-legal norms that exist apart from the state. 
After all, most liberal theorists begin their analysis with the state: how it is formed, how it is 
justified, and the philosophical underpinnings for its operations. Nonstate actors are surely 
important to this inquiry in that they clash with the liberal state, and of course the state, under 
liberalism, should often reach positions of accommodation with these nonstate actors. But what is 
being described is fundamentally the state and how it views the nonstate. 
In contrast, pluralism assumes that the relevant inquiry is the entire range of legalities that 
course through the everyday experience of people. This means that the lived reality of 
communities and day-to-day perceptions of legitimacy and efficacy are far more important than 
philosophical models. In addition, a pluralist perspective is more likely to see individuals and 
groups, rather than just the state, as having agency and therefore playing crucial roles in navigating 
the interaction of normative systems and using those systems strategically. 
For example, in the classic colonial interaction, a quasi-liberal, state-based legality was 
layered on top of an indigenous legal system. A liberal theorist would focus on the newly imposed 
system and on how it either accommodated or refused to accommodate local communities. This 
view is akin to what John Griffiths famously called weak legal pluralism, because it assumes a 
preexisting legitimate system that gets to decide how much to accommodate or tolerate 
competing systems.26 In contrast, strong legal pluralism would start from the observation that the 
colonial system rarely, if ever, wiped out the indigenous system altogether, and would instead 
focus on the interaction of these legal systems and the ways in which local actors used both 
systems strategically to gain leverage. 
This is only one of many possible examples. But the point is that where liberalism only sees 
state legal systems and the challenges they face, pluralists focus on interactions among a much wider 
range of legal and quasi-legal systems. And global legal pluralism recognizes that nation-states 
must work within a framework of multiple, overlapping jurisdictional assertions by state, 
international, and nonstate communities. 
Just as important, pluralists are much less likely to insist on positivist definitions of law and 
are therefore more willing to notice law even in the absence of coercive power. This is especially 
significant in the global arena where statements of legal norms may be highly effective 
 
26 John Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 24, no. 1 (1986): 1–55. 
regardless of formal enforcement power.27 For example, liberal sovereigntists sometimes insist 
that international, transnational, and nonstate legal norms have no independent valence and that 
instead states simply pursue their own interests.28 In contrast, pluralists unpack the idea of a state 
interest, recognizing that conceptions of proper policy do not simply arise in a vacuum. Rather, 
they are developed by human beings operating with various sets of assumptions, ideas about justice, 
conceptions of global strategy, and beliefs about morality. These assumptions, ideas, and cognitive 
categories are themselves shaped in part by legal consciousness. Accordingly, the legal norms that 
are “in the air” at any given moment of history—including international, transnational, and nonstate 
legal norms—may well affect how both policymakers and ordinary citizens think about the state’s 
interests.29 
Thus, legal pluralism provides a richer account of how law actually operates, both 
domestically and internationally, than the positivist vision of liberal sovereigntism. We imbibe 
legal norms and cognitive categories even when we are not consciously aware of the norm in 
question. We are persuaded by legal norms even when those norms are not literally enforceable. 
We act in accordance with law because doing so has become habitual, not necessarily because we 
seek to avoid sanction. We conceive of our interrelations with others in terms of law because our 
 
27 E.g., Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) (describing the ability of legal 
norms to promote adherence even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms). 
28 See generally Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 4. 
29 Paul Schiff Berman, “Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law,” review of The Limits of 
International Law, by Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Texas Law Review 84 (2006): 1265–306. 
long-term interests require that we do so, even when our short-term interest might seem to 
counsel otherwise. And the existence of a legal norm alters the constitutive terms of our 
relationships with others as well as the costs of noncompliance. All of these factors may be 
overcome in some circumstances. But the mere fact that legal norms are sometimes violated doesn’t 
mean that those norms have no constraining force at all. And only by thinking more broadly about 
changes in legal consciousness and the complicated social, political, and psychological factors 
that enter into the conceptualization of state interests can we begin to understand how nonstate law 
operates. 
In addition, instead of treating the state as a unitary “personality” with a single set of interests, 
pluralists recognize that the real world is far messier, with a vast number of constituencies both 
within the governmental bureaucracy and outside it. This cacophony of voices is important 
because many of these voices, when advocating policy positions, can use the moral authority or 
persuasive power of international, transnational, and nonstate norms for leverage. These norms 
therefore become a tool of empowerment for particular actors. And given that any state policy 
decision is inevitably the result of a contest among various bureaucratic power centers, all of which 
are themselves influenced by outside pressure groups, lobbyists, NGOs, and the like, a more 
complex understanding of the global legal arena would need to explore ways in which plural 
legal norms empower specific interests both within and without the state policymaking apparatus. 
In short, global legal pluralism offers a more complicated descriptive account of the interaction 
of normative systems, the strategic action of individuals and groups in deploying these multiple 
systems to pursue their interests, and the subtle processes by which even norms without coercive 
power can change legal consciousness and have impact over time. These nuances are often 
elided in the traditional liberal legal analysis. 
4 Global Legal Pluralism and International Law 
For many years, international law triumphalists hoped that the rise of international legal 
institutions would resolve the messy world of relative authority, regime collision, and 
fragmentation by creating one overarching, hierarchically superior set of norms that most people 
would follow most of the time. And yet, precisely as legal pluralism scholarship would predict, 
the hierarchy, once articulated, was immediately contested. Thus, international law, though it 
often has very real impact,30 ends up being one voice among many, all competing for authority. 
In addition, again as legal pluralism scholarship predicts, it quickly becomes clear that 
international law itself is not one entity. Instead, different international legal regimes, 
promulgated for very different reasons and administered by different tribunals and regulatory 
bodies, often conflict and collide with each other, leading to the need for negotiation, 
contestation, and hybrid provisional compromises.31 
Legal pluralists, though they are more willing than international relations realists to see the 
importance of international law, part ways from committed internationalists because legal 
pluralists are unwilling to be confined by a single formalist definition of law or a preexisting 
hierarchy of legitimacy among legal orders; instead, they recognize that any such definition or 
hierarchy is likely to derive from a particular subject position and therefore will accord certain 
social action the mantle of law while denying other social action the same respect. Indeed, for 
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31 Margaret A. Young, ed., Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge: 
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years, pluralists wrestled with trying to define law before effectively giving up the project as 
inevitably fraught and biased, privileging some instantiations of law over others.32 Accordingly, 
pluralists turned the focus to observing sociological fact: where do we see “institutionalised and 
authoritatively mediated collective action?”33 What is it that individuals and communities come 
to consider to be law over time? What pronouncements of decision makers do they defer to, what 
rules do they obey, and whose decisions are they willing to enforce? And what practices do they 
enter into that impact their practical sense of binding obligation? 
This approach allows us to include a variety of “emergent” systems within our purview and 
to conceptualize the possible creation of global law from below, born not of treaties and nation-
states, but of more inchoate orders, such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the 
International Accounting Standards Board, the consumer-based Clean Clothes Campaign, 
international standard-setting bodies, the Codex Alimentarius, and even the law promulgated and 
imposed by online platforms such as Google or Facebook.34 
The problem with this capacious, nonessentialist vision of law, from the point of view of 
internationalists, is that they have spent decades trying to convince committed nation-state 
sovereigntists that international law is superior law that should act as an independent constraint 
on states. Then along come legal pluralists who claim that seemingly everything and anything is 
law and it is a free-for-all, and that law is followed or not followed based on sociological and 
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33 This formulation is drawn from Lindahl, supra note 11, at 1. 
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political factors, and the only way to tell what is actually law is to watch and see how the norms 
are articulated and which norms come to be treated as law. After all, if every instance of 
“institutionalised and authoritatively mediated collective action” gets to be called law, then there 
is no way to authoritatively determine which of those many legal regimes is superior to the 
others. Hans Kelsen would roll over in his grave!35 
Ironically, in some contexts the pluralist perspective on law is actually helpful in defending 
the importance of international law. For example, as mentioned previously, some international 
relations and formalist scholars make polemical arguments against the very existence of 
international law, based on the fact that it often does not have independent coercive power 
behind it. Thus, according to these scholars, international law is simply an epiphenomenon of 
state power: states follow international law when it is in their interest to do so, and they ignore it 
when it is not.36 
Against such assertions, legal pluralism offers an alternative way of understanding how law 
actually operates. From a pluralist perspective, law is not only that which coercively forces 
individuals (or states) to do things that they do not want to do. Indeed, pluralists argue, coercive 
power is not the only way that law can have an effect, either domestically or internationally. As 
Martha Finnemore has noted, “[s]ocially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and 
shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings of what is 
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important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued 
goods.”37 As a result, law has an impact not merely (or perhaps even primarily) because it keeps 
us from doing what we want. Rather, law changes what we want in the first place. 
Thus, law operates as much by influencing modes of thought as by determining conduct in 
any specific case.38 It is a constitutive part of culture, shaping and determining social relations39 
and providing “a distinctive manner of imagining the real.”40 Indeed, “it is just about impossible 
to describe any set of ‘basic’ social practices without describing the legal relations among the 
people involved—legal relations that don’t simply condition how the people relate to each other 
but to an important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship. ”41 In this vision of 
law, the fact that international legal norms do not have coercive power behind them is not 
determinative because coercive power is not the only way that law constrains.42 
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Yet, even though legal pluralism provides a cogent set of arguments to defend the efficacy of 
international law, this is insufficient to international law triumphalists because legal pluralism 
has no means of supporting the legitimacy of international law as superior law. After all, if there 
are many normative communities in the world all asserting forms of jurisdiction, who gets to 
decide which assertions are permissible and which aren’t? In short, who gets to decide who gets 
to decide? 
To a legal pluralist, however, this is a nonsensical question. After all, let us assume that we 
could get most people to agree that a particular assertion of jurisdiction was legitimate, whatever 
that might mean. Inevitably there would be some community somewhere that would resist this 
jurisdictional claim. And from that community’s perspective the assertion of jurisdiction would 
be illegitimate. 
Of course, we are accustomed to thinking of jurisdictional assertions as the unique province 
of a sovereign entity. But jurisdiction is more appropriately understood as a site of contestation 
and engagement among multiple relative authorities. Indeed, the assertion of jurisdiction itself 
can open space for the articulation of norms that function as alternatives to, or even resistance to, 
established power. 
For example, in seventeenth-century England, common law courts began to issue writs of 
prohibition in order to prevent the rival Court of High Commission from hearing certain cases.43 
 
43 See Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke 
(1552–1634) (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1957), 295 (explaining how Sir Edward Coke 
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In response, some critics argued that the common law courts were overreaching and that the 
question of which court had proper jurisdiction to hear a case could only be resolved by the 
king because the authority of all judges derived from him.44 In Prohibitions del Roy, Lord Coke 
describes himself as having replied to such characterizations of the king’s authority: 
 
[T]rue it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent Science, and great 
Endowments of Nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the Laws of his Realm of 
England With which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under 
the Law, which was Treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod 
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege [that the King should not be under 
man, but under God and the Law].45 
 
Thus, Coke refused to place the king beyond or above the domain of law. 
By challenging the king and affirming the jurisdiction of the common law courts, Coke 
asserted the primacy of law even over sovereign power. In doing so, however, he also stripped 
the courts of the very “institutional protection . . . that ordinarily stands behind” courts and 
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enforces their orders.46 After all, who is to enforce legal jurisdiction when the king stands in 
opposition? This story makes clear both that alternative normative bodies can exercise power 
separate from (and perhaps contrary to) the governing power of the state and that the exercise of 
such power is risky and always contingent on broader acceptance by communities (and coercive 
authorities) over time. Nevertheless, despite the risk, the rhetorical assertion of jurisdiction itself 
can have an important effect.47 For example, Coke’s memorialization of this jurisdictional 
assertion in his treatise was undoubtedly part of the Enlightenment movement to limit the power 
of kings and assert a higher rule of law. Thus, one can see a direct line from Coke to Thomas 
Paine, who declared that in the new United States of America, “law is [K]ing.”48 
It is, of course, a commonplace to say that courts lack their own enforcement power, making 
them dependent on the willingness of states and individuals to follow judicial orders. As 
discussed previously, this observation is often used as an argument for the irrelevance of 
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international law itself: because it is not state law, so the argument goes, it is subject to the 
realpolitik demands of pure power and is perhaps not really law at all. Similarly, we might think 
the claims to jurisdictional authority by nonstate communities are not really law because the 
power of these nonstate communities might depend on the willingness of states to carve out 
zones of jurisdictional autonomy for such communities. 
But it is important to recognize that neither of these examples is fundamentally different 
from how law always operates, even when articulated by nation-state authorities. Indeed, courts 
can only ever exercise authority to the extent that someone with coercive power chooses to carry 
out the legal judgments issued. 
Thus, the essence of law is that it makes aspirational judgments about the future, the power 
of which depends on whether the judgments accurately reflect evolving norms of the 
communities that must choose to obey them. If this is so, then we might view extraterritorial 
lawmaking as substantially similar to lawmaking within territorial bounds. For example, if a 
French court issues a judgment against a U.S. corporation, it might be true that the court’s 
command is only literally enforceable if an American authority will agree to enforce it,49 but the 
same court’s decision against the corporation’s French subsidiary is similarly dependent on the 
enforcement power of a sovereign. After all, if the executive branch of the French government 
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were to refuse to enforce the order against the subsidiary, that order would have no more force 
than the order against the American parent. Finally, regardless of whether a U.S. sovereign entity 
ever enforces the French court’s order, the court might never need literal enforcement from a 
U.S. court. If the U.S. corporation wishes to continue commercial activity in France, the 
corporation may choose to comply “voluntarily” anyway.50 
So, if the assertion of jurisdiction is always an assertion of community dominion, then all 
legal decisions rely on both that particular community’s acquiescence and the willingness of other 
entities to recognize, enforce, or comply with the jurisdictional assertion. In this vision, we come 
to understand that all jurisdictional assertions depend largely on the rhetorical force of their 
articulation of norms to entice allegiance. Jurisdiction is really “jurispersuasion,” the power to 
speak law and try to convince others to follow that law over time. 
This should not really be such a radical idea. We can all think of examples where 
jurisdictional assertions and legal pronouncements are contested, resisted, subverted, disobeyed, 
and transformed over time. Likewise, no state or empire has ever been able to govern absolutely 
with no resistance. And of course there are always and forever many places in the world where 
state institutions and governments have far less actual power than other legal and quasi-legal 
entities. 
The key point is that in order to resolve a normative conflict there is no way to get outside of 
social context in order to play God and simply decree that one set of norms or one decision 
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maker is authoritative and the rest are not. Or perhaps another way to put it is that one can try to 
make such a decree, but there is no reason to believe that such a decree will be universally 
accepted. To the contrary, as soon as one makes such a decree, that too will be resisted, 
contested, and subverted. There is no end to the contestation. And that is perhaps the core 
descriptive insight of legal pluralism. 
International law triumphalists may well be concerned about this reality. And as a political 
matter I may personally agree that certain international norms should be followed by 
populations. And I, for one, hope nation-states sufficiently imbibe these norms and that they seep 
into consciousness, hardening into the taken-for-granted sense of just “how things are.” For 
example, the idea of individual human rights may have become part of legal consciousness in 
that way, and people around the world are now far more likely to frame their claims in the 
language of rights than a century ago. 
But again, notice that we are back in the realm of politics and sociological reality. If a norm 
seeps into legal consciousness, then it functions effectively as law, whether it’s an international 
law norm, a nation-state norm, or a nonstate norm. But as to abstract claims of legitimacy or 
superiority, legal pluralism recognizes that any such claims are only ever partial and contested. 
And if that serves to frustrate both nation-state sovereigntists and international law triumphalists, 
so be it. It is the world we actually live in. The sovereigntist and internationalist models of 
legitimacy are merely distorted simplifications of reality. 
5 Global Legal Pluralism as a Normative Project 
As a descriptive enterprise, global legal pluralism is now far less controversial than it once was. 
In particular, even the most diehard legal positivist would now likely acknowledge that sub-, 
supra-, or non-state normative systems do impose real constraints that have real impacts. Thus, 
legal pluralists might be tempted simply to declare victory on the thick description front and stop 
there. 
And yet one might choose to go further and pursue a more normative path. After all, a richer 
descriptive account of the world is also in part a celebration of possibility. If “the way things are” 
is not natural and inevitable, but instead culturally constructed and contingent, then that means 
alternatives are open to us. Legal pluralism is in some sense neither about the state or the local, 
but is instead a fundamental celebration of the values of diversity, multiplicity, compound and 
flexible identities, and resistance to the seemingly natural state of things.  In addition, legal 
pluralism could be seen to support the idea that law can be a productive terrain of contestation, a 
forum for dialogue across difference. 
Consider the philosopher Iris Marion Young’s idea of “unassimilated otherness,” which she 
posited as the relation among people in the ideal “unoppressive city.”51 Young envisioned ideal 
city life as the “‘being-together’ of strangers.”52 These strangers may remain strangers and 
continue to “experience each other as other.” Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall 
group identification and loyalty. Yet they are open to “unassimilated otherness.” They belong to 
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various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with other groups. But they do 
so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those others. Such interactions instantiate an 
alternative kind of community, one that is never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that 
nevertheless prevents different groups from ever being completely outside one another. In a 
city’s public spaces, Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal. “The city consists in a great 
diversity of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities and 
functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public spaces.” In this vision, there 
can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations without ostracism. 
This is the idealism that could be seen to be at the core of global legal pluralism. And yet at 
this moment in history, that precise set of ideals is under attack. Indeed, if states can be 
hegemonic and oppressive, it seems clear that nationalists can be even more so. In Europe, we 
see a pushback against the loose integration of the European Union in favor of tribalism. This is 
particularly troubling because the decades since 1945 have been by far the most peaceful and 
economically prosperous in Europe’s many centuries of history, and we should not allow the 
governance pluralism that characterizes the European Union to be lightly tossed aside because of 
vague calls for border protection and nation-state sovereignty. At the same time, worldwide we 
see communities refusing to allow increased migration and diversification, instead calling for 
more stringent policing of borders, the building of walls, and so on. And of course religious 
intolerance and sectarian prejudice fuel numerous conflicts around the world. Most recently, 
Donald Trump’s assault on all the institutions of democratic governance and the rise of the far 
right in Europe represent existential threats to the post–World War II order and perhaps the ideal 
of democratic multiculturalism itself. 
Given this context, might scholars wish to do more than just describe? Can we engage with 
this flight from the ideals of diversity and make the case for institutions that, however imperfectly, 
embed pluralist ideals and values into their design? If so, it might be useful to pursue what it 
might look like to think of global legal pluralism as an explicitly normative project. 
But that simply raises more questions. What might it mean for legal pluralists to play out 
some of the normative implications of their work for theories of law, policy, and institutional 
design? Do legal pluralists have something distinctive to add to contemporary law and 
governance debates? Or would asking such questions ultimately undermine the core insights of 
legal pluralism by committing scholars to particular modes of governance hierarchy, transforming 
strong legal pluralism back into weak legal pluralism? And if so, is that a trade-off we can bear as 
scholars in exchange for policy relevance? And even if we were willing to make such a trade-off, is a 
legal pluralist position inherently in tension with any effort at systemic reform because legal 
pluralism recognizes that any system will always be partial, contested, and contingent? Or might 
systemic reform that is partial, contested, and contingent nevertheless be better than no reform at 
all? 
Most fundamentally, legal pluralists might be able to mount a clear-throated defense of legal 
rules and governance institutions that foster interaction and dialogue among those multiple norm-
generating communities, rather than dissolving diversity either into universalism, on the one 
hand, or tribalism, on the other. And we need that defense right now, if only to name the values 
of diversity, dialogue, and communication across difference that are at the core of the world we 
might be on the brink of losing in the global retreat into authoritarian populism. 
In considering the idea that legal pluralism might be a normatively desirable approach to the 
design of legal systems and procedures, we might ask (as summarized previously) whether legal 
or governmental systems might sometimes affirmatively seek to create or preserve spaces for 
productive interaction among multiple, overlapping communities and legal systems by 
developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to bring those 
communities and systems into dialogue rather than dictating norms hierarchically. Further, 
global legal pluralism suggests that such an approach might be normatively desirable regardless 
of context, making it potentially a globally generalizable theory. 
For example, while constitutions traditionally try to demarcate clear hierarchical lines of 
authority among different decision makers, a more pluralist constitutional design might, instead, 
create increased opportunities for dialectical legal interactions. Along these lines, an institution 
such as federalism, which allows for creative contestation both among states and between the 
federal government and the states as a whole, can be seen as opening space for dialogue.53 Or a 
court’s practice of publishing dissenting opinions can be seen as a mechanism that gives voice to 
contestation, allowing the dissenting voice to be heard in the marketplace of ideas.54 
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Turning to the international and transnational realm, as discussed previously, some who 
study international law fail to find real “law” because they are looking for hierarchically based 
commands backed by coercive power.55 In contrast, a pluralist approach understands that 
interactions among various tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely to take on a 
dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review traditionally undertaken by 
appellate courts nor simply the dialogue that often occurs under the doctrine of comity.56 
Legal pluralism as a normative project might therefore specifically seek to identify those 
procedures, institutions, and practices that provide frameworks for managing diversity without 
dissolving it into universality. And although managing diversity is in some sense also the goal of 
liberal legality, it may be that legal pluralism offers a distinctive and perhaps sometimes a more 
effective approach. In order to construct such an approach, we might use Hannah Arendt’s idea of 
“bearing with strangers” to think of how law could also build models of dialogue across difference 
rather than either walling difference off, on the one hand, or dissolving difference altogether, on the 
other. From there, we can develop a set of principles that might be built into legal procedures, 
institutions, and practices that take seriously this pluralist approach. 
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Global legal pluralism also recognizes the possibility that at least sometimes this 
pluralism of normative authority may be preferable to a system that imposes a single 
authority, because the reality of legal pluralism empowers individuals to strategically 
operate among normative and procedural regimes. In a world of multiple overlapping legal 
and quasi-legal systems, there are multiple ports of entry. An argument unheard in one 
forum can gain traction in another. A norm articulated in one place can be persuasive 
elsewhere. The powerless in one system can access power in another. As Robert Cover 
recognized decades ago, there are inherent advantages to a system “that permits tensions and 
conflicts of the social order” to be “played out in the overlapping jurisdictional structure of 
the system itself.”57 Of course, powerful repeat players can also strategically use such a plural 
system to shop for desired norms. Thus, the mere existence of global legal pluralism does not 
magically level the playing field among parties of disparate power or render such power 
disparities irrelevant. But there can be little doubt that jurisdictional pluralism opens up 
discursive space, providing opportunities for agency that may not have existed otherwise. 
Global legal pluralism as a normative project is not strongly universalist in the sense of 
insisting on a single set of norms. Instead, it is simply suggesting a set of possible procedural 
values that should be considered, recognizing that even these procedural values might sometimes 
be overridden based on other possible values. Yet, even these comparatively weak proceduralist 
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commitments undeniably incorporate Habermassian dialogic values .58 And given that these 
values are asserted as part of a global normative theory, albeit a proceduralist one, for committed 
pluralists this normative global legal pluralism is overly liberal and not really pluralist at all.59 
I have argued elsewhere why I think global legal pluralism as a normative project, though 
potentially consonant with liberalism, is nevertheless distinct from liberalism because it 
emphasizes participatory and dialogic values that are not as core to the liberal model.60 But I 
cannot deny that it certainly does espouse a set of dialogic values. And this proceduralist version 
of pluralism is liberal to the following extent: what I am seeking are procedures, institutions, and 
practices that bring multiple norm-generating communities into greater dialogue with each other. 
For example, the margin of appreciation doctrine formulated by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) creates an iterative, interactive process among communities that would not exist 
as strongly if the ECHR simply tried to impose an international norm hierarchically on the one 
hand, or fully deferred to local norms on the other. Likewise, a hybrid court or tribunal with 
members of multiple communities sitting next to each other will tend to create more dialogue 
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among those communities in reaching an outcome. Or a choice-of-law doctrine that requires 
decision makers to look to norms other than those of their own community in order to find 
possible rules of decision will likely result in more thoughtful consideration of those alternative 
communities, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case. In each of these circumstances, the 
goal is to make decision makers more restrained in their exercise of jurispathic power and more 
accommodating of difference. And of course, these same principles could be, and sometimes are, 
adopted by nonstate communities in managing their interactions with others. 
But it is obviously true that some communities don’t even want to join the dialogue. Other 
communities wish to exclude certain segments of the population (e.g., women) from the 
conversation. Some might even question whether rational dialogue is what is needed to make 
decisions. For example, if a religious leader seeks merely to impose an asserted universal truth 
by fiat, there is little room for the conversation, deference, and accommodation that a more 
pluralist mechanism would hopefully engender. Accordingly, a proceduralist vision of pluralism 
contains a bias that favors inclusion, participation, and conversation, and some illiberal 
communities will reject it on that basis. 
Thus, as some critics have pointed out, the sorts of procedural mechanisms, institutional 
designs, and discursive practices that I advocate require “a larger normative environment in 
which pluralism has to be negotiated.”61 This is true and, as noted previously, that normative 
environment is one in which reasoned discourse among multiple worldviews is both 
accommodated and fostered as much as possible. Accordingly, there must at least be agreement 
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among the different normative communities to participate in the common enterprise. If they 
refuse to participate, then it seems to me there is little that can be done within the legal arena. 
In my book, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders,62 I draw on 
theorist Chantal Mouffe’s distinction between “adversaries” and “enemies.”63 Adversaries are 
willing to enter the same social space and contest substantive normative disagreements; enemies 
are unwilling even to engage. The goal of my procedural pluralism is to encourage as many 
normative communities as possible to become adversaries rather than enemies. I argue that a 
system that routinely squelches alternative voices is likely to create more enemies over time, 
whereas one that seeks to allow multiple voices to be heard and tries for accommodation as much 
as possible will be more successful at turning at least some of those enemies into adversaries. 
Again, if this simply means bringing more enemies into the ambit of a liberal legal order that 
seeks maximum accommodation and deference to plural norms from plural communities, then I 
am happy to embrace that form of pluralism (and that form of liberalism). 
But some want legal pluralism to be something far more radical (and far more impractical). 
So, for example, in my book I make what I think is a relatively moderate and restrained 
argument that liberal communities might try to open limited space for sharia courts to operate so 
long as those courts do not trench upon fundamental values of the liberal community.64 And it 
should be noted that even that moderate and restrained version of the argument draws fire from 
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critics across the political spectrum, from rights advocates worried about illiberal practices to 
nation-state sovereigntists worried about giving any authority at all to nonstate communities. Yet 
Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson, in an article critiquing my book,65 want to push much further 
than I do. They claim that it’s not really pluralism unless I go all the way and advocate that 
liberal communities allow sharia courts to operate regardless of whether or not they violate 
fundamental values of the liberal community.66 However, just because one embraces insights 
from legal pluralism does not mean that the values of pluralism must necessarily and always 
trump any other values a community might hold. It simply cannot be that legal pluralism is only 
a true normative position if it is pursued to the exclusion of all other values, interests, and 
commitments. 
Galán and Patterson treat my balancing of the values of pluralism with other values as 
ambivalence. They correctly note that my book celebrates pluralism as a descriptive fact, that I 
appreciate the existence of multiple overlapping communities, and that I resist universalizing 
tendencies that reduce diversity. But they see all of that as inconsistent with my effort to 
encourage the creation of legal mechanisms to manage this pluralism. However, these positions 
are not inconsistent at all. Indeed, they are likely to be our only hope of addressing the reality of 
pluralism without either squelching alternative views on the one hand, or having no legal order at 
all on the other. 
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I acknowledge that striking this balance is extraordinarily difficult and perhaps impossible to 
achieve fully. But that does not mean it is incoherent or analytically inconsistent to try. And most 
importantly my book simply argues that it is normatively desirable for communities to make the 
effort. Indeed, I am far less concerned with how individual cases are decided or how individual 
institutions or mechanisms are designed than I am in trying to ensure that whoever reaches those 
decisions considers the values of legal pluralism as part of the calculus. So, yes, legal pluralism 
gets subsumed within a broader set of values held by any given decision maker or community, 
but that does not mean that factoring in the values of pluralism does not create long-term changes 
in the way the decision maker or community tackles procedural or institutional design 
challenges. 
Indeed, as discussed previously, it is not possible to create any truly pluralist normative 
order given that pluralism assumes that there will inevitability be resistance to any normative 
order, however inclusive. Thus, there can be no such thing as normative global legal pluralism in 
a pure sense. As soon as any normative regime is articulated, it cannot be fully plural. But that 
doesn’t mean that a legal system that is more self-conscious in its effort to accommodate plural 
voices might not still be preferable to one that is not. 
The response, therefore, to the objections of the strong pluralists is similar to the response to 
the committed internationalists. The concerns of both groups are correct, but there is no way to 
fully extricate oneself from such concerns. Any honest descriptive account of law must recognize 
that in the face of any assertion of law, even the most global and all-encompassing, pluralism is 
never defeated; what is legitimately law to one group will be illegitimate to others. At the same 
time, any normative institutional design decision or procedural choice or judicial or legislative 
rule will always and necessarily be “jurispathic,” as Robert Cover would say,67 thereby choosing 
one law over another and striking a blow to pluralism. 
So, what to do in response to these two opposite critiques, both of which are accurate? My 
answer is to recognize the conundrum and therefore always to be self-conscious about one’s 
assertions of legitimacy or legality or one’s exercises of hegemonic power. This emphatically 
does not mean that one should never make such assertions; only that one should be aware of the 
reasons that such assertions are inevitably problematic. Lindahl calls such an approach  
“restrained collective self-assertion,”68 and it is likely the most persuasive way of understanding 
how authority works in a world where authority is only ever relative, not absolute. 
Many of the chapters in this volume explore institutional instances of restrained collective 
self-assertion, providing examples of institutional designs, procedural mechanisms, and 
discursive practices that maintain space for consideration of multiple norms from multiple 
communities: margins of appreciation, complementarity, subsidiarity, zones of autonomy, hybrid 
participation agreements, reciprocal recognition, and so on. All of these mechanisms (and many 
more) can be understood as ways that legal, governmental, or quasi-governmental regulatory 
systems can seek to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among multiple, 
overlapping communities and legal systems. 
 
67 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law 
Review 97 (1983): 4–68, 53 (describing judges as inevitably “people of violence” because their 
interpretations “kill” off competing normative assertions). 
68 Lindahl, supra note 11, at 287. 
Significantly, deploying these pluralist procedural mechanisms, institutional designs, or 
discursive practices does not require a commitment to any overarching universal set of 
substantive values, although as discussed previously they do perhaps require a commitment to the 
liberal value of dialogue across difference. Restrained collective self-assertion means only a 
pragmatic willingness to engage with other possible normative systems and potentially to restrain 
one’s own jurispathic voice for the sake of forging more workable, longer-lasting relationships 
and harmony among multiple communities. 
Significantly, restrained collective self-assertion does not mean no collective self-assertion. 
Sometimes, of course, such deference to the “other” will not be possible; this proceduralist 
normative vision of legal pluralism only seeks to embed habitual practices in which deference is 
considered and attempted, not in which it is always implemented. 
Restrained collective self-assertion seeks to, at least, draw the participants to the 
contestation into a shared social space. This approach builds on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that 
agreements are reached principally through participation in common forms of life, rather than 
through agreement on substance.69 Or, as Mouffe put it, we need to transform “enemies”—who 
have no common symbolic space—into “adversaries.”70 Adversaries, according to Mouffe, are 
“friendly enemies: . . . friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies 
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because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way.”71 Ideally, law—
and particularly legal mechanisms that foster restraint in collective self-assertion—can function 
as the sort of common symbolic space that Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a 
constructive role in transforming enemies into adversaries. 
Restrained collective self-assertion is global in the sense that it aims to force consideration 
of what is necessary to have a smoothly functioning trans-community legal order, what U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun once called “the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance 
and goodwill.”72 On the other hand, it is pluralist because it demands that the assertion of “self” 
always be conscious of the “other” that is potentially being excluded. Any assertion of 
jurisdiction and any legal decision is inevitably jurispathic: it “kills off” one interpretation as it 
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This global legal pluralist framework, therefore, aims simultaneously to celebrate both local 
variation and international order, recognizing the importance of preserving both multiple sites for 
contestation and an interlocking system of reciprocity and exchange. Of course, actually doing 
that in difficult cases is a Herculean and perhaps impossible task. Certainly, mutual agreement 
about contested normative issues is unlikely and possibly even undesirable. Thus, the challenge 
is to develop ways to seek mutual accommodation, while keeping at least some play in the joints 
so that diversity is respected as much as possible. Such play in the joints also allows for the 
jurisgenerative possibilities inherent in having multiple lawmaking communities and multiple 
norms.75 Always, the focus is on trying to forge the Wittgensteinian sort of shared social space 
that Mouffe describes for transforming enemies into adversaries. 
Taken together, these principles provide a set of normative criteria for evaluating the ways 
in which legal systems interact. In addition, the principles could inform a community (whether 
state-based or not) that wishes to design mechanisms, institutions, or practices for addressing 
pluralism. Of course, such criteria are not exclusive. For example, a procedure or practice that 
manages pluralism well but denies certain norms of fundamental justice might be deemed 
problematic, regardless of its embrace of pluralism. Thus, I do not say that embracing pluralism 
always overrides other concerns. After all, many legal and quasi-legal orders are repressive and 
profoundly illiberal, and their norms may be resisted on those grounds. Instead, the important 
point is simply that pluralist considerations should always at least be part of the design, 
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inculcating habits of mind that promote deference and restraint. Accordingly, decision makers 
should always ask: Are there other normative systems at play here? Should I restrain my 
jurispathic voice? Is there some other decision maker who might more appropriately speak to this 
issue? Are there ways I could develop a hybrid decisional framework that brings more voices to 
the table? And how can I design ongoing practices, procedures, or institutional arrangements to 
constitutionally embed these inquiries? 
6 Global Legal Pluralism and Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism is often thought to be the opposite of pluralism because cosmopolitanism is 
seen as a justification for universal overarching norms that govern beyond and above the state. In 
this conception, cosmopolitanism is equated with universalism, and if that is the definition of 
cosmopolitanism then it does seem to be antithetical to pluralism. Certainly, from a pluralist 
perspective there are reasons to question both the desirability and the feasibility of universalism, 
at least in some contexts. 
As to desirability, it is not at all clear that universalism is an unalloyed good. Indeed, if we 
think of ourselves solely as citizens of the world, we might tend to dissolve the multi-rootedness 
of community affiliation into one global community. Thus, universalism may fail to capture the 
extreme emotional ties people still feel to distinct transnational or local communities and 
therefore ignore the very attachments people hold most deeply. 
In addition, universalism inevitably erases diversity. This is a problem for three reasons. 
First, such erasure may involve the silencing of less powerful voices. Thus, the presumed 
universal may also be the hegemonic. Second, preserving legal diversity can be seen as a good in 
and of itself because it means that multiple forms of regulatory authority can be assayed in 
multiple local settings. Just as states in a federal system function as “laboratories” of innovation, 
so too the preservation of diverse legal spaces makes innovation possible. Third, a legal system 
that provides mechanisms for mediating diversity without dissolving difference necessarily also 
provides an important model for mediating diversity in day-to-day social life. For example, one 
argument for a strongly speech-protective interpretation of the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution is that the effort required to tolerate the provocative speech of others is the same 
effort required to tolerate others more generally.76 Thus, a legal system that demands tolerance of 
diversity rather than its erasure is more likely to create the context for a tolerant society than one 
that, in contrast, seeks uniformity as its goal. 
Nevertheless, even if one rejects these normative arguments and embraces universalism as a 
goal, it is difficult to believe that, as a practical matter, harmonization processes will ever fully 
bridge the significant differences that exist among states, let alone the variety of nonstate orders 
at play in the world. This is because many differences both in substantive values and attitudes 
about law arise from fundamentally different histories, philosophies, and worldviews. People are 
therefore likely to be either unable or unwilling to trade in their perspectives for the sake of 
universal harmony. Moreover, even if they were so inclined, it would be difficult to develop a 
process for determining which norms should be elevated to universal status and which should 
give way. Thus, when harmonization is possible, it is usually a slow, laborious undertaking, 
limited to codifying normative convergences that have already occurred over time. As a result, 
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harmonization is generally backward-looking, and in a rapidly changing world, harmonization 
processes will tend to lag behind social, technological, and economic realities. Accordingly, even 
the most optimistic universalist would have to acknowledge that normative conflict is at the very 
least a constant transitional reality that will require hybrid processes to address. 
But perhaps we can view cosmopolitanism as something different from universalism. After 
all, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily require a belief in a single global welfare or even a 
single universal set of governing norms, nor does it necessarily require that global welfare 
always dominate over state welfare. Indeed, properly understood, cosmopolitanism need not be 
incompatible with pluralism at all. To the contrary, a more nuanced understanding of 
cosmopolitan theory offers a useful framework for conceptualizing the interplay of multiple 
actors precisely because it recognizes that people have multiple affiliations, extending from the 
local to the global (and many nonterritorial affiliations as well).  
For example, Martha Nussbaum has stressed that cosmopolitanism does not require one to 
give up local identifications, which, she acknowledges, “can be a source of great richness in 
life.”77 Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we should think of ourselves as surrounded 
by a series of concentric circles: 
 
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows the 
extended family, then, in order, neighbours or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and 
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fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, 
historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest 
one, humanity as a whole.78 
 
Therefore, we need not relinquish special affiliations and identifications with the various groups 
of which we may feel a part. 
In this vision, people could be “cosmopolitan patriots,” accepting their responsibility to 
nurture the culture and politics of their home community while at the same time recognizing that 
such cultural practices are always shifting, as people move from place to place or are 
increasingly affected by spatially distant actors.79 “The result would be a world in which each 
local form of human life is the result of long-term and persistent processes of cultural 
hybridization—a world, in that respect, much like the world we live in now.”80 
Thus, cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of international citizenship in the sense 
of international harmonization and standardization, but is instead a recognition of multiple 
refracted differences where people acknowledge links with the “other” without demanding 
assimilation or ostracism. Cosmopolitanism seeks “flexible citizenship,” in which people are 
permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and allegiances, including 
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nonterritorial communities.81 The cosmopolitan worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted 
particularity of personal identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping communities. 
“[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of 
(re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.”82 
In recent years, Patrick Glenn has offered a rich account of the role of nation-states within 
this kind of multiplicity.83 He argues that there never has been and never will be a nation-state 
that was not ultimately cosmopolitan in character because all states exist as part of a world of 
relative overlapping authorities. In the end, he argues that we should look to the structural ways 
that states operate in, and adapt to, this cosmopolitan reality. And in doing so, he focuses on 
many of the same sorts of procedures and institutions that global legal pluralism has explored 
over the past two decades. A cosmopolitan pluralist conception of law, therefore, might be seen 
to capture the middle ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and expansive 
universalism on the other. A territorialist approach fails to account for the wide variety of 
community affiliations and social interactions that defy territorial boundaries. A more 
universalist perspective, by contrast, which seeks to imagine people as world citizens first and 
foremost, might seem to be a useful alternative. But such universalism tends to presuppose a 
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world citizenry devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion about the relative 
importance of such ties. Thus, universalism cuts off debate about the nature of overlapping 
communities just as surely as territorialism does. 
A cosmopolitan pluralist conception, in contrast, makes no attempt to deny the multi-rooted 
nature of individuals within a variety of communities, both territorial and nonterritorial. Thus, 
although a cosmopolitan pluralist conception might acknowledge the potential importance of 
asserting universal norms in specific circumstances, it does not require a universalist belief in a 
single world community. As a result, cosmopolitan pluralism offers a promising rubric for 
analyzing law in a world of diverse normative voices. 
Moreover, in this conception, cosmopolitanism and pluralism are in no way incompatible. 
Cosmopolitanism recognizes multiple affiliations and overlapping community identification as 
well as multiple legal systems, whereas pluralism recognizes that these legal and quasi-legal 
systems can include both state and nonstate entities. Thus, the evolution of global legal pluralism 
is fully compatible with cosmopolitan theory, at least as understood in this more nuanced 
framework. 
7 Global Legal Pluralism, the Rule of Law, and Democracy 
As global legal pluralism has successfully put forth an alternative conception of the global legal 
order, we have seen challenges to the idea that pluralism provides a useful conceptual 
framework. These challenges most often focus on two dimensions: first, whether a pluralist 
framework undermines the stability and predictability that are the hallmarks of the rule of law; 
and second, whether recognizing the potential validity of transnational, international, and 
nonstate law fundamentally undermines democratic principles by recognizing the importance of 
norms articulated beyond the state polity. 
With regard to rule of law, the concern is that any theory that leaves supremacy claims 
undecided is simply a recipe for chaos. Yet to some degree there is no way to escape this chaos 
because any claim to superior authority will inevitably be contested and ultimately only be 
relative, not absolute. And this is a particular problem if one tries to establish more hierarchical, 
absolutist structures. They don’t have the flexibility to adapt to change, challenge, and 
contestation. Pluralist structures, in contrast, often represent “a hybrid between hierarchical and 
network forms of order.”84 As Krisch argues, such a hybrid “allows for regimes with an 
internally hierarchical structure, but denies them ultimate supremacy, and thus navigates between 
routine hierarchies and exceptional disruptions, to be solved eventually only through consensual 
forms.”85 Thus, perhaps counterintuitively, the flexibility inherent in pluralist structures can be a 
source of stability because tensions in the social order have space to play out in the legal 
governance structure itself. Pluralism provides openings for multiple actors and multiple voices 
and thus provides safety valves that more hierarchically based institutions may lack. As such, we 
may find pluralist structures to be more stable than hierarchical ones over time.86 
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As to democracy, some maintain that only territorially defined nation-state communities can 
legitimately claim to exercise democratically grounded power. But such a statement assumes 
much of what global legal pluralism seeks to challenge, and it is far from clear that the 
imperatives of democratic sovereignty necessarily render any consideration of transnational, 
international, or nonstate jurisdictional assertions illegitimate. First, it is no threat to sovereignty 
for a nation-state to decide that its sovereign interests are advanced overall by deciding to defer 
to norms or decisions of other institutions (whether state-based or not) that limit what it can 
otherwise do. Second, some nonstate norms, such as international human rights norms, may 
actually strengthen domestic democracy, properly understood. This is because constitutional 
democracy already includes within it the idea that “all people (and not merely the majority) can 
associate themselves with the project of self-government.”87 Thus, obedience to nonstate norms 
that minimally protect minority interests or multilateral institutions that help guard against 
capture of government by minority factions actually enhances democracy rather than subverts 
it.88 Third, at least when nonstate norms influence or are formally incorporated into domestic 
law, such incorporation often occurs through the actions of domestic political actors on either the 
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national or local level,89 and it is unclear how there could be democracy objections to such 
influence. Finally, and most fundamentally, legal norms have always migrated across territorial 
boundaries, and precepts that come to be thought of as constitutive of a community can often be 
traced historically to ideas borrowed from other sources outside that community.90 “Ideas, 
norms, and practices do not stop at the lines people draw across land,”91 and nonstate norms are 
always translated into local vernacular.92 This process of “vernacularization” and the debate 
about ideas, norms, and practices that go along with it are and always have been part of 
democratic discourse, not in opposition to it. As Seyla Benhabib has argued: 
 
The spread of cosmopolitan norms . . . has yielded a . . . political condition [in which] the 
local, the national and the global are all imbricated in one another. Future democratic 
iterations will make their interconnections and interdependence deeper and wider. Rather 
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than seeing this situation as undermining democratic sovereignty, we can view it as 
promising the emergence of new political configurations and new forms of agency.93 
 
Indeed, if democracy is understood not just as majoritarian preference but as dialogue across 
difference, pluralist structures can actually enhance, rather than undermine, democracy. 
In short, pluralist structures provide multiple ports of entry and multiple opportunities for 
contestation. Such forms of contestation and counterdemocracy sit alongside typical electoral 
processes and may be seen to be part of the character of a multidimensional democratic system. 
As Krisch points out, “[e]lections will probably remain central to any conceptualization of 
democracy, but some of the weight they carry domestically might, in the post national sphere, be 
borne by other, contestatory mechanisms.”94 
These are not complete answers to either the challenge about certainty or the challenge 
about democracy. But they do indicate that global legal pluralism does have a range of possible 
responses to those challenges. Further research will be needed to empirically evaluate the force 
of these challenges in a variety of factual settings and to further build philosophical 
underpinnings for pluralism that respond to these concerns. 
8 The Politics of Global Legal Pluralism 
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The politics of global legal pluralism are complex and multifaceted. As noted at the outset, 
global legal pluralism builds upon earlier scholarship focused on legal pluralism in more 
localized settings. And as a descriptive project this scholarship eschewed normative statements 
either advocating for or against different aspects of legal pluralism. 
This is not to say, of course, that legal pluralism as a scholarly project was (or ever could be) 
devoid of implicit values and normative biases. Indeed, one might say that two strong normative 
undercurrents have always animated legal pluralism. First, legal pluralism was an attack on legal 
centralism, the idea that law was the sole province of the state and its formal institutions.95 Pluralists 
sought to undermine the assumption of state power, discovering agency and subversive opportunities 
among those presumed to be marginalized. As such, legal pluralism was a way of critiquing the 
power of the state and even at times celebrating resistance to state hegemony. Second, legal 
pluralism often had an implicit pro-local bias, particularly in its emphasis on forms of resistance 
to colonial state power. Perhaps echoing cultural anthropology’s more general celebration of the 
local, legal pluralists tended to make the local, the indigenous, and the anticolonial populations the 
heroes of the narrative. Likewise, left-wing writers on development issues have sometimes used 
concepts drawn from legal pluralism to celebrate resistance to transnational elites, such as the 
World Bank.96 
Of course, there is nothing intrinsically progressive or better or more enlightened about the 
“local.” And local communities can themselves reflect significant power asymmetries. 
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Moreover, “community” is not a static concept. Communities are always changing, and 
contestation within communities is ever-present. Indeed, legal pluralists increasingly chart the 
ways in which local actors use the language of nonlocal legal tropes to gain leverage within their 
community. 
Legal pluralism has also sometimes been seen as supporting a more reactionary politics. As 
Grégoire Mallard describes in his chapter in this volume, French anthropologists played 
prominent roles in French colonial administrations, thus aligning themselves with colonial 
power. Moreover, Mallard reveals that some of these pluralists resisted the idea that Algeria 
could vote for independence on the ground that Algeria was not one coherent political 
community, but rather many communities. Thus, a perfectly plausible descriptive observation 
was transformed into a political weapon for maintaining colonial rule. According to Mallard, this 
association of legal pluralism with colonialism taints the idea of legal pluralism in French 
academic circles to this day. 
If global legal pluralism’s descriptive project is politically charged, its normative project is 
even more fraught. This is true even though global legal pluralism does not advocate any specific 
substantive norms, focusing instead on the emancipatory, jurisgenerative potential of legal 
procedures, institutions, and practices that provide a constructive forum for dialogue across 
difference. Despite the seeming absence of strong normative content, global legal pluralism is 
subject to attack from committed internationalists, committed nation-state sovereigntists, and 
even committed pluralists. 
As discussed previously, those advocating strong international legal rules worry that global 
legal pluralism undermines hard-won victories by “robbing” international law of its intrinsic 
superiority and therefore giving too much play to local community sentiment, which 
internationalists tend to view as backward, regressive, and parochial. On the other hand, nation-
state sovereigntists object to pluralism’s insistence on relative rather than absolute authority as 
well as the important role of nonstate norms in challenging the hegemony of the state. Finally, 
committed pluralists see global legal pluralism’s normative project as overly indebted to liberal 
legality and the potentially constructive role of formal legal institutions in navigating difference, 
thereby jettisoning too much of legal pluralism’s radical critique of legal centralism. 
Thus, the evolution of global legal pluralism is on a different trajectory from the original 
legal pluralists. Indeed, global legal pluralism as a normative project derives from a different 
context and has different substantive aims from those of what we might call “classic” legal 
pluralism. Importantly, the classic legal pluralists were principally engaged in critique of a 
dominant view of legality, and they were doing it primarily from the perspective of thicker 
description. It is no accident that many of the original legal pluralists were social scientists, not 
law professors or legal philosophers. And while these authors did likely have a normative 
sympathy for counterhegemonic legalities, such normative commitments were generally unstated 
and implicit. 
In contrast, many global legal pluralists are actually trying to advocate a plausible set of 
institutional arrangements and procedural mechanisms in order to make dominant legal and 
governmental entities more pluralist in orientation. That is a very different starting point, and it is 
therefore not surprising that these scholars do indeed tend to embrace aspects of liberal legality 
as a given. Thus, it is undoubtedly true that the new generation of global legal pluralism 
scholarship has not severed ties with classic state-based legal theory (and its limits), but it is also 
true that this new generation is no longer aiming to completely sever such ties in the name of 
radical critique; this new work is instead trying to introduce more pluralist frameworks into 
hegemonic structures in order to make them more accommodating to hybridity. And that means 
there will be limitations on the range of hybridity, the language used, and the sorts of arguments 
entertained. But, these scholars would argue, the result is still better than if no pluralism had 
been introduced into the framework at all. 
Some may not agree. They may say that it’s not a truly pluralist vision unless it goes all the 
way and rejects (or at least challenges) the discourse of law itself. It is fine to make that 
argument. But I think such critics should at least also acknowledge that such a position makes it 
difficult to put forward a practical program with a chance of being implemented in a state-based 
world. Accordingly, the pragmatic programmatic recommendations of constitutional pluralism or 
global legal pluralism is not an un-self-conscious adoption of hegemonic frameworks, but a 
conscious choice to participate in a discourse about institutional design that otherwise would not 
be available without adopting certain assumptions and conventions. 
Does this evolution mean that global legal pluralism is not truly pluralism at all? Certainly 
the new variants of legal pluralism are less engaged in radical critique and so are willing to 
countenance liberal legal hegemony even while seeking to open more space for alternative 
voices within the framework. And it is likewise fair and appropriate to criticize these approaches 
for precisely that choice. But I think it is unduly doctrinaire and closed-minded to say that such 
approaches cannot rightly call themselves pluralist or draw on an earlier tradition, even if that 
tradition was somewhat different. The nature of scholarly threads is that an idea put forth in one 
context and with one aim can be appropriated and developed in another context for slightly 
different purposes. And of all people pluralists should understand that. 
We can perhaps criticize global legal pluralism for not being sufficiently counterhegemonic, 
but as we do so, we need to first acknowledge that the goals (and institutional roles) of the new 
pluralism may be fundamentally different from the old, which accounts for much of the 
difference. Second, we need to recognize that at least some of this pluralism work is keenly 
aware that, as noted previously, the pluralist vision is often consistent with liberalism even 
though it is a structurally different framework; there is no lack of self-consciousness or self-
suspicion in that. And, third, we must understand that whether or not a scholar is an “heir” to an 
earlier strand of scholarship is not for a purist gatekeeper to regulate. Ideas morph in plural ways, 
and the recent moves to global legal pluralism are just a few of the many plural variants of 
pluralism, which is as it should be. 
Finally, given that we live in an era with more displaced peoples than perhaps ever in human 
history,97 it is necessary to consider the politics of global legal pluralism as it pertains to borders 
and migration. On the one hand, some, such as Peter Spiro in his chapter in this volume, argue 
that legal pluralism, because it focuses on norm-generating communities, must necessarily defer 
to the way in which those communities choose to define themselves. Accordingly, so the 
argument goes, legal pluralism offers no way to combat exclusionary immigration policies, the 
building of walls to fortify borders, and so on. On the other hand, global legal pluralism as a 
normative project favors institutional arrangements that encourage dialogue across difference. 
And of course more open immigration is a quintessential mechanism for creating such dialogue 
across difference. Moreover, if communities are ever-shifting anyway, there is no reason to reify 
 
97 See generally United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement 
in 2017,” https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. 
any particular definition of community and freeze it in place. The ongoing diversification of 
communities can therefore be seen as an aim of global legal pluralism. 
Assimilationist policies form another flashpoint for the politics of global legal pluralism. In 
order to effectuate Young’s vision of unassimilated otherness, subcommunities should not be 
coerced into complete conformity with a more dominant group. This approach might place legal 
pluralists in opposition to strongly secular policies such as those in France that discourage or 
disallow indicia of religious belief to be displayed or discussed in the public arena. However, if 
part of the goal is to place different communities in dialogue with each other, required language 
instruction might be considered an appropriate intervention. 
Even this brief discussion suggests the many complications inherent in defining a single 
politics of global legal pluralism. As either a descriptive or normative project, global legal 
pluralism can be deployed in the service of many different political agendas and can be seen to 
support many different political programs, which of course should not be surprising given the 
capacious view of law that global legal pluralism represents. 
This returns us to the core point that global legal pluralism is neither fully global nor fully 
pluralist. To the extent it refuses, as a descriptive matter, to anoint some legal assertions as 
necessarily hierarchically superior to others, it is not fully global and will always be subject to 
criticism from committed internationalists. And to the extent it embraces as a normative matter 
institutional designs, procedural mechanisms, and discursive practices to effectuate an 
overarching goal of fostering dialogue across difference, it is asserting a global procedural value 
of dialogue and therefore is not fully pluralist. Indeed, given the broad (and often undefined) 
vision of law embraced by legal pluralists, it is perhaps not properly considered “legal” either! 
But for all that, it may be that global legal pluralism is the best we can do to conceptualize 
the actual operation of norms in the world. Global legal pluralism asks us to adopt as capacious a 
definition of law and authority as possible, while pushing for any collective self-assertion to be 
self-conscious and restrained, all in order to keep the dialogue alive. 
In this vision, communities assert law as part of a conversation that never ends; they wield 
authority as part of an endless Mobius strip of contestation, they make choices amid the 
pluralism, and those choices inevitably squelch some voices and honor others. It is the self-
recognition of our own limitations as authorities that encourages us to act in a self-restrained 
manner and in deference to other perspectives and points of view, at least to the extent we can. 
And, at the end of the day, that is probably the best that law can ever do: foster dialogue across 
difference and inculcate habits of self-restraint in imposing norms, turning as many enemies into 
adversaries as possible. 
Descriptive global legal pluralism helps us see areas of contestation more clearly and 
comprehensively, instead of exclusively focusing on the state. And normative global legal 
pluralism proposes a set of social institutions, procedures, and practices for channeling conflict 
while seeking jurisgenerative solutions that honor all the community affiliations in play to the 
extent possible. These solutions are never perfect, of course, but that should not deter us from the 
effort. At its best, law is not just rules, but a complex set of intellectual, social, political, and 
ethical practices. And these practices are the best we imperfect human beings can do to mediate 
conflict, seek common discourse, and strike provisional compromises. As a result, it seems to me 
that it is worth the effort to keep law alive and pursue both the insights and the underlying values 
of global legal pluralism as we hang on to our humanity and diversity during the conflicts still to 
come. * 
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